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I. Introduction 
With no blazer, long hair, and often provocative Marxist t-shirts, left-wing populists burst into 
parliaments all across Europe several years after the catastrophic 2008 financial crisis. Their 
entrance has, in some cases, broken the two-party systems and destabilized politics. They have 
also managed to include their outright socialist agendas into their respective parliaments and 
enacted substantive change that will remain imprinted in the political culture of Europe. Being this 
impactful to current European politics, it is surprising that academics have paid little attention to 
them, but this essay will provide a small summary and analysis of its rise. In this paper I ask: how 
did left-wing populist movements and parties become prominent in Europe in the past six years, 
and to what extent did the 2008 recession play a role in triggering these movements? 
Social Democratic parties, along with their center-right counterparts, used to dominate 
European politics. PSOE in Spain, Labour in the U.K, SPD in Germany, and PASOK in Greece 
were all left-of-center political parties that served as the undisputed leaders of the left. However, 
their decline has caused a split in the left side of the ideological spectrum.1 Inspired by the success 
of Tony Blair’s “third way,” social democratic parties began embracing more aspects of capitalism 
and turned their back on income inequality and other market failures such as indiscriminate 
evictions.2 This, as well as the rise of the ‘globalization cleavage’ created a stage where left-wing 
populist parties could answer the needs of voters whose quality of life remained the same or 
decreased by the early 2000’s.3 
 Although much attention has been paid to the rise of far right populist movements in 
Europe, the leftist populists have not undergone as much scrutiny. Populism is broadly 
characterized by its anti-establishment rhetoric which can be seen in both right and left-wing 
populism. Besides this characteristic, academics have not agreed upon overarching qualities that 
tie both camps of populism.4 Looking specifically at left-wing populism, most research has come 
in reaction to Latin America’s exploration of left-wing populism in the 1990s and 2000s, and this 
will be further discussed in the literature review. Nevertheless, left-wing populism “define[s] the 
enemy in terms of bearers of socio-economic structures and rarely as particular groups.”5 Two 
specific European countries experienced the rise of left-wing populism in a way that was 
particularly strong and similar in process: Greece and Spain. Both countries had a two-party system 
balanced between the center-left and center-right before the 2008 crisis, their banking industries 
were seriously damaged, unemployment hit record-highs, and austerity measures imposed by the 
EU created an unbearable economic situation for the poorest citizens. 6 
Because of the many similarities in the cases of Greece and Spain, this essay will compare 
the rise of left-wing populism in both countries and investigate the effects of the 2008 economic 
crash on the rise of these movements. I find that the 2008 crisis played a crucial role in the rise of 
left-wing populists in both countries, but in different capacities. In Greece, the economic hardships 
that individuals faced drove them to vote for a new party that rejected austerity measures. In Spain, 
however, it was a poor economic perception of the country that drove some to vote for the rising 
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populists. In both cases, Euroscepticism helped the rise of these parties, but it did so more in Greece 
than in Spain. These findings are significant because they show that the 2008 financial crisis was 
a catalyst for left-wing populists who brought political instability to Europe and helped foster anti-
EU sentiments. The paper also highlights the lack of research and analysis surrounding left-wing 
populism’s rise in other regions of the world.  
The essay will first summarize the existent literature, outline the comparative method, dive 
into each of the cases, and provide a conclusion and summary of the comparison.  
II. Literature Review 
Latin America made a quick turn to the left at the end of the 1990’s, and theorists have 
analyzed this recurrent phenomenon that has now appeared in some Euopean countries. Firstly, 
one must categorize the type of populist left that has appeared. As defined above, a leftist populist 
is characterized by pursuing unapologetically leftist economic policies while using a rhetoric that 
attacks the sector of society that holds the most capital.7 Furthermore, Judis (2016) argues that left-
wing populism is dyadic, as opposed to the triadic nature of right-wing populism. In other words, 
“left-wing populists champion against an elite or establishment,”8 whereby there is a one 
directional bipolar attack from the poor to the rich. Right-wing populists on the other hand attack 
the elite for favoring a third group, such as immigrants, Muslims, or other ostracized communities. 
This characteristic of left-wing populism is one that is first born in Latin American and later seen 
in the European context.9  
Having defined the type and characteristics of populism, focus can now be put on the causes 
for its rise. Literature finds three main reasons behind the rise of left-wing populist parties in 
Europe: individual financial hardship after the 2008 recession, the perception of economic decline, 
and the intervention of the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund) in domestic economic policies.  
Much of the research regarding electoral reaction to the 2008 crisis has generally grouped 
all populists across the spectrum in their calculations. Hernandez and Kriesi (2016), for example, 
conclude that the ‘losers’ of globalization in Europe were more likely to vote for populist parties 
after the 2008 recession.10 In countries where left-wing populists are the predominant force over 
right-wing populists, those votes benefitted them, such as Greece and Spain. The effect of an 
individual’s financial struggles on the electoral rise of the left is somewhat contested. One the one 
hand, Rooduijn and Burgoon (2017) found that an individual’s poor economic situation will make 
them more likely to vote for a radical party if the overall situation of the country is prosperous.11 
This theory partially aligns with Casteñada (2006), who argues that increased inequality leads 
voters to align themselves with politicians who promise a redistribution of wealth.12 Furthermore, 
Lindvall (2014) compared the electoral results several years after the Great Depression and the 
Great Recession in Europe. In both cases, one can observe an initial support of right wing parties, 
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but a subsequent move towards the left in the years after the recession.13 Moreover, specific 
characteristics of a country’s macroeconomic data may also impact electoral results. Those who 
are unemployed were found to be more likely to vote for SYRIZA in the Greek elections that saw 
the decline of PASOK.14 A higher national debt also prompted more votes to the left according to 
Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav (2008).15 
However, some have argued that research has not fully proven that macroeconomic factors 
affect electoral decisions: instead, it is the perception and reaction to a large-scale economic 
recession what gives rise to left-wing populist parties. Powel and Whitten (1993) note that 
economic factors are not very reliable in cross-country analyses, and that the ability to put blame 
on the incumbent party predicts electoral results more frequently.16 This is extremely relevant to 
the cases of Spain and Greece because both had a solid two-party system with frequent changes in 
power, thus, voters could easily punish the status quo by voting for an emerging and exciting party 
that voiced issues forgotten by the establishment. Furthermore, this type of dramatic switch from 
a mainstream party to a new radical party is described by Powell and Tucker (2014) as Type A 
volatility.17 In this scenario, the switch is more closely related to party system instability and is 
more likely to happen when the economy is performing poorly. Large and dramatic recessions will 
ignite voters to reject incumbents and support radical parties that provide a fresh perspective to 
politics.  
Lastly, other academics have criticized the role of international organizations in the midst 
of economic crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Latin America, and the EU in 
Europe acted as money suppliers and economic policy supervisors, but domestic critics often 
argued that their impositions were too overbearing and harmed lower classes disproportionately. 
Left-wing populists in both regions often used this rhetoric during their rise to power. Although 
research on this topic in Europe is not consolidated, the Latin American case has been much more 
scrutinized. According to Pop-Elches (2009), prominent left-wing populists of the 1990’s and 
2000’s such as Fujimori, Da Silva, and Chavez frequently attacked the IMF’s austerity measures. 
Criticized as neo-imperialistic policies, the IMF’s debt plans gave a platform for these populist 
movements to gain attention quickly.18 
III. Methods 
This essay will now move to answer its central question: how did left-wing populist 
movements and parties become prominent in Europe in the past 6 years, and to what extent did the 
2008 recession play a role in triggering these movements? Particularly, I examine individual 
financial struggles, overall economic perception of the country, and the reaction against EU 
encroachment in the economy as variables that gave rise to left-wing populism, inspired by the 
literature review above. Using the comparative method, the essay will specifically contrast the 
 
13 Johannes Lindvall,.“The Electoral Consequences of Two Great Crises.” European Journal of Political Research 
53, no. 4 (2014): 760.  
14 Eftichia Teperoglou, Emmanouil Tsatsanis, and Elias Nicolacopoulos, “Habituating to the New Normal in a Post-
Earthquake Party System: The 2014 European Election in Greece.” South European Society and Politics 20, no. 3 
(July 3, 2015): 348.  
15 Maria Victoria Murillo, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. “Voting for the Left or Governing on the Left?” 
Working paper, Columbia University, NY, (2008). 
16 Bingham G. Powell, and Guy D. Whitten. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of 
the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (1993): 392.  
17 Eleanor Neff Powell, and Joshua A. Tucker. “Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries: New 
Data, New Results and New Approaches.” British Journal of Political Science 44, no. 1 (January 2014): 124.  
18 Grigore Pop-Eleches, “The Great Reconciliation?: Latin America and the IMF in the 1990s,” In From Economic 
Crisis to Reform, 263. IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton University Press, 2009.  
                     
    
 
 
cases of Spain and Greece, looking at the rise of Podemos and SYRIZA respectively between 2014 
and 2019. Following the framework developed by Lijphart (1971), the comparative method 
resembles the statistical method but has too few cases to permit systematic control.19 Instead, the 
process focuses on delving into each of the cases while focusing on answering the central research 
question by ensuring a systematic analysis of the cases. The data utilized will primarily come from 
other research on the matter, national surveys, and EU institutions.  
 IV. Case 1: Spain 
 Spain’s return to democracy in 1976 prompted a fabricated two-party system, due to the 
small District Magnitude in the constituencies for parliament. The Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP) ruled Spanish politics from 1982 until 2015, when 
two new parties erupted into parliament bringing an end to the establishment of Spain’s politics. 
One of those new parties, Podemos, gained 1.3 million votes in the 2014 EU parliamentary 
elections and 20.7% of the vote in the 2015 general election, by campaigning on a platform of 
political renewal and the end to austerity measures. The 2008 financial crisis hit Spain especially 
hard compared to its fellow European countries. Unemployment rose to 26% in 2013 (55% for the 
youth), public debt skyrocketed to 93% of GDP, and GDP declined for 9 consecutive quarters.20 
Furthermore, overall discontent with the political establishment reached record highs. By 2014, 
more than half of Spaniards perceived the political situation as ‘very bad’, according to the Centro 
de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Moreover, that same year corruption was perceived by 44% 
as the most important problem in Spain, a record high. After several years of economic hardship 
and austerity measures, protests propagated all across Spain. In 2007 there were a total of 10,000 
protests, but in 2010 that number had risen to 25,000. Protestors began to organize themselves and 
eventually formed the so-called ‘15M movement,’ which advocated for an end to austerity 
measures, legal repercussions for corrupt politicians, and an end to the many economic adversities. 
Out of the 15M movement came Podemos, which embodied those principles and decided to create 
change from within the Spanish political system instead of relying solely on social mobilization, 
protests, and strikes. It quickly rose to prominence and gained much presence in local 
governments, winning key city halls in Madrid, Barcelona and Cadiz.  
 With such a catastrophic economic situation and an established two-party system that can 
easily be punished, one would quickly assume that the main reason for the rise of Podemos was 
decline in the population’s economic status. However, this is widely disputed among researchers. 
Although some cross-country studies regarding the rise of left-wing populism point towards 
economic hardship as the root cause for the left turn in politics, this does not seem to directly apply 
to the Spanish case.21 In Spain’s 2015 elections, an individual’s poor economic performance had 
a modest impact on their decision to vote for Podemos according to several studies.22 23 For 
instance, an individual who was unemployed was not more likely to vote for Podemos, instead, 
they were more prone to vote for center-right PP. However, those who had trouble paying their 
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bills were more likely to switch from PSOE to Podemos, and those who encountered overall 
personal financial difficulties were 13% more likely to switch from PSOE to Podemos in the 2015 
elections.24 Other studies find an insignificant correlation between one’s personal finances and 
their choice to vote for Podemos. Therefore, one’s personal financial situation has had a moderate 
or insignificant impact in the rise of Podemos in Spain. Although Podemos presents itself as a 
party for the many with a distinct emphasis on those with financial instability, it turns out that their 
voters do not represent the lower-class proletariat they romanticize. An analysis on the voters for 
each major political party by EL PAÍS using data from the CIS found that Podemos is the least 
popular party among people with the lowest wages (under 600 euros per month).25 Instead, they 
were most popular with the college-educated middle class, thus demonstrating that an individual’s 
financial instability does not make it more likely for them to vote for Podemos. 
Alternatively, studies point towards an individual’s perception of the overall economic 
situation as the defining variable that makes someone vote for Podemos. A cross-country analysis 
on the rise of left-wing populism in nine European countries found that “the role of personal 
economic factors, […], pales in comparison with the paramount influence of perceptions of the 














 Figure 1 27, from the same study, portrays the likelihood that a specific variable will 
influence someone to vote for Podemos. Specifically, the more to the left the black dot is locate, 
the more likely it is that a voter will choose a left-wing populist. Moreover, the study shows that 
although having issues with income makes someone slightly more likely to vote for left-wing 
populists, other individual financial variables – such as being unemployed or having worsened job 
conditions – do very little in impacting the vote for Podemos. The perception of the national 
economy (last variable), on the other hand, was clearly more relevant in predicting whether an 
individual will vote for Podemos.28  
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 Lastly, most studies that look at left-wing populism in Spain barely mention the impact of 
the troika – referring to the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund who imposed many austerity measures during the 2008 crisis – in 
voters’ decisions to vote for Podemos. However, Pablo Iglesias, co-founder and leader of 
Podemos, used attacks against the troika as a crucial part of his rhetoric.29 The 15M/indignados 
movement protested heavily against austerity measures, and consequently attacked the troika. The 
rhetoric was mostly present during the 2014 EU parliamentary elections, where Iglesias criticized 
the austerity measures instituted by Zapatero and Rajoy on the troika, and promised to advocate 
for an end of austerity. In terms of data, it is hard to discern the concrete impact of such a rhetoric 
on the electoral results for one main reason: Spaniards have outstandingly better views of the EU 
compared to other member states. According to the Eurobarometer of 2015, 29% of Spaniards had 
an unfavorable view of the EU, compared to the 44% of Greece.30 However, Spaniards distrusted 
the European Central Bank the most among member states (77%).31 Therefore, given that attacks 
on the troika for encroaching on domestic economic policy are central to the rhetoric of Podemos, 
and given the rapid success in the EU elections, one could conclude that it did aid in the rise of 
Podemos.  
The 2008 financial crisis did indeed have a significant impact in people’s decisions to vote 
for Podemos, but not because one’s financial situation necessitated the economic change Podemos 
advocated for, but rather because of discontent with the overall economic situation of Spain. 
V. Case 2: Greece 
 Without a doubt, the hardest hit country in Europe after the 2008 recession was Greece.32 
Similarly to Spain, unemployment soared, debt-to-GDP ratio became the highest in Europe, and 
GDP growth entered an unprecedented decline and contraction.33 Similarly to Spain, a stable two-
party system had existed for several decades prior to the 2008 recession with a recent prevalence 
of the democratic socialist party PASOK. This allowed voters to punish the established parties 
given the rise of a new political party. The post-2008 era vanished the political status-quo of 
Greece and brought forward the left-wing populist group SYRIZA, under the leadership of Alexis 
Tsipras. Founded in 2004 out of a partnership between several communist and other far-left parties, 
it played a small role in parliament until it cast aside many of its more extreme stances – including 
cooperative productive schemes and massive nationalization plans –  and presented a program of 
Keynesian policies to revive the Greek economy in 2014.34 The rhetoric and policies of SYRIZA 
reacted against the austerity measures that PASOK was forced to implement by the troika, and 
promised a new kind of economic recovery based on socialist ideals.  
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 As with Podemos, SYRIZA was the most popular choice with students, young people, and 
the educated.35 However, the personal financial situation of an individual was more relevant than 
in the case of Spain. According to a study by Teperoglou (2015) analyzing the results of the 2014 
European Elections in Greece, SYRIZA was most popular with public-sector workers, who 
received massive wage cuts.36 Furthermore, they were also very popular with the unemployed and 
those who reported that their individual economic situation had worsened as a result of the crisis. 
Given that GDP per capita was reduced by almost half in a mere seven years, (as opposed to a 25% 
reduction in Spain) it seems understandable that personal economics might impact elections more 
prominently than in Spain. Moreover, these results fall more in line with cross-country studies of 
left-wing populism in Europe which conclude that the ‘losers’ of globalization are more likely to 
vote for left-wing populist parties since they are critical of the neo-liberal ideals upon which 
globalization is built.  
 The perception of the economy appears to have not played as crucial of a role in 
determining electoral choice. This is probably because pessimism surrounding the economy in 
Greece is much broader than in any other European country. In 2017, only 2% of Greeks viewed 
the national economic situation as “good”, compared to 28% in Spain.37 Therefore, it is hard to 
discern any conclusions from that variable if there is little variation in opinion between voters. 
Regarding the perception of outside international organizations controlling Greece’s 
economy, mistrust of EU institutions and the troika is more prevalent among SYRIZA voters. That 
the troika spent billions of dollars to aid Greece’s finances definitely made an impact on voters 
since the organizations had much more of a voice on the austerity measures that Greeks 
experienced. Although generally Greece is one of the most anti-EU countries in Europe, mistrust 
of institutions is especially high among SYRIZA voters. Additionally, SYRIZA was born out of 
Eurocommunist parties, many of which believed in the values of European unity and peace, but 
rejected the neoliberal ideals that bound member states together through the EU. With such a 
history and an overwhelming rejection of the EU-imposed austerity measures, it is no surprise that 
Tsipras’ prime proposition would be to block EU institutions from deciding Greece’s economic 
policy.38 The effectiveness of Tsipras’ rhetoric can be seen in the graph below, which demonstrates 
that the more opposed to European integration a voter is, the more likely they were to vote for left-
wing populism.39 This trend is reflected in many other studies and surveys, indicating that 






       
 
 
35 Teperoglou, Tsatsanis, and Nicolacopoulos. “Habituating to the New Normal,” 348.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Stokes, Bruce. “Economic Confidence.” Pew Research Center, September 18, 2018. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/09/18/the-current-economic-mood/. 
38 Nikolaos Nikolakakis, “Syriza’s Stance Vis-à-Vis the European Union Following the Financial Crisis: The 
Persistence of Left Europeanism and the Role of the European Left Party.” European Politics and Society 18, no. 2 
(April 3, 2017): 129.  
39 Andrés Santana and José Rama, “Electoral Support for Left Wing Populist Parties in Europe: Addressing the 
Globalization Cleavage.” European Politics & Society 19, no. 5 (December 2018): 572.  
                     



















Figure 2: Greek voters’ likelihood of voting for left-wing populists.  
 
To summarize, although perception of the economic situation in Greece was not a good 
predictor of support for left-wing populism because there was overall pessimism regarding the 
economy, Euroscepticism and an individual’s financial situation were relevant.  
VI. Conclusion 
The 2008 financial crisis ushered in a new era of economics, society, and politics in Europe. 
Southern Europe specifically was most vulnerable to economic hardship, and stagnant economies 
angered citizens who mobilized against the political status-quo that had remained unchallenged 
for so long. Politics all throughout Europe became uncertain as populism rose, and left-wing 
populism managed to seriously challenge the social democratic parties. In Spain and Greece, the 
respective left-wing populist parties rose quickly and took over municipal, regional, and even 
national governments in the case of Greece. 
The political contexts of Spain and Greece were fairly similar, but the differing outcomes 
after the 2008 crisis prompted two separate rises in left-wing populism. Ultimately, it can be 
concluded that the aftermath of the crisis sparked a renewal of the far left in both countries, but it 
impacted politics due to two different variables. In Spain, the anger against the mismanagement of 
the economy by the two traditional parties, paired with the outrage against the many corruption 
scandals that arose after 2008, allowed Podemos to capitalize. Someone’s personal economic 
hardship did not have as much of an impact on their political choice as overall economic perception 
did. This is perhaps because traditional parties like the PP advertised themselves as parties of 
stability that could generate jobs and economic security, whereas the established educated middle 
class that cared for feminist, environmental, and worker’s issues at large preferred a new and 
exciting choice in politics. Therefore, those who had negative perceptions of the domestic 
economy were more supportive of the populist left. In the case of Greece, however, the 2008 crisis 
was much more impactful of people’s socioeconomic situation than in Spain, which consequently 
made Greeks more preoccupied by their shrinking wallets than macroeconomic data. Lastly, 
people from both countries had negative reactions to the way international organizations such as 
the EU and the IMF intervened in domestic economic policy. In Greece, this was accentuated 
because those organizations played a much bigger role in the economy than in Spain. Podemos, 
                     
    
 
 
on the other hand, limited itself to attacking the troika for representing the wealthy elite countries 
that forced austerity measures for southern European countries, but it was not a central aspect of 
their discourse.  
On the question of what country experienced more change due to the rise in left-wing 
populism, the answer is debatable. Although one could argue that its effects in Greece have been 
more prominent because SYRIZA won the government, one could also say that the change they 
promised against austerity was not accomplished given the catastrophic 2015 referendum situation. 
In Spain, Podemos has only very recently entered into government in coalition with the PSOE, but 
it did enact significant change in the cities it governed, such as climate change policy in Madrid, 
and debt reduction in Cadiz.  
The last question to answer is, why does this matter to Europeans today? Firstly, the 
unstoppable rise of left-wing populism in Europe decimated the political status-quo in many 
countries, and it is very unlikely that Greece or Spain will return to their antiquated two-party 
systems. This can lead to serious political instability (as seen currently in Spain), and could even 
call for a restructuring of politics at large. In Spain, this could mean adapting the upper and lower 
houses, revisiting proportionality in elections, and even an overhaul of the entire constitution. 
Secondly, the massive shift to the left in European politics has recalibrated the rest of the spectrum. 
In both Greece and Spain far-right neo-fascist parties have gained much support, partly in reaction 
to the rise of SYRIZA and Podemos. Furthermore, the other parties have also been forced to rethink 
their politics, and the social-democrats have picked up social issues that they left behind during 
the crisis. Therefore, the effects of left-wing populism will be long-lasting and impact the future 
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